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The rise in terrorist acts carried out by individuals who have been raised and radicalized 
within the Western countries they are attacking has increasingly become a common 
topic for study and conversation over the past few decades. With revelations that 
numerous British individuals have now joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the 
issue has heightened the interest of the British population and government. This study 
utilizes theories of revolution and psychological theories of radicalization in order to 
analyze the rise in homegrown terrorism within the British context on three levels: the 
societal, the global, and the individual. This examination demonstrates that while 
multiple variables are involved, they are interacting and contingent, showing that 
isolation of a single aspect cannot lead to a full understanding of how and why this 
situation has arisen. A historical review shows that immigration and other externally 
originated forces helped create dysfunction in the British social system, which, 
combined with the influence of globalization, has allowed the process of radicalization 
to take root. The study concludes that this disequilibrium is a result of misalignment of 
the values of the population and the socioeconomic structure of the society, which, if 
not corrected, will potentially allow situations such as these to develop.  
 
 3 






Chapter 1: Methodology and Research Design………………………………………...7 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework..………………………………………………….10 
Theories of Revolution…………………………………………………………...10 
The Social System………………………………………………………..12 
The Disequilibrated Social System………………………………………14 
Johnson on the Level of the Individual…………………………………..20 
Theories of Radicalization.....................................................................................25 
Ted Gurr: Communal Conflict…………………………………………...29 
The Importance of “Cliques”…………………………………………….31 
The Role of Religion……………………………………………………..32 
 
Chapter 3: Contextual Analysis………………………………………………………..34 
Britain in Disequilibrium………………………………………………………...34 
Exogenous Sources of Change……….…………………………………..34 
Immigration…………………………………………………………….34 
Globalization…………………………………………………………....36 
Endogenous Sources of Change………………………………………….37 
The Thatcher Era……………………………………………………….37 
Conservative Change and the Loss of Authority……………………………………38 
Multiculturalism in Britain………………………………………………38 
Racial and Ethnic Discrimination………………………………………..41 
Social and Economic Disadvantage……………………………………...44 
The Rushdie Affair………………………………………………………45 
Limits to Political Participation and Integration…………………………47 
 The Individual in British Disequilibrium………………………………………...49 
  Public Opinion Among British Muslims………………………………...49 
The Spread of Ideology………………………………………………….53 
Impacts of Globalization on Radicalization……………………………..55 
A Supportive International Environment…………………………....57 
Accelerators and the Use of Force……………………………………………....60 
An Example: Jihadi John………………………………………………………...63 
 


















Only through hindsight can we identify the ways in which the horrific terrorist actions 
seen by our generation could have been avoided. While it is important to understand how 
radical ideologies have been allowed to inspire such attacks, this analysis does not serve 
to place blame on any particular country, group, religion, or individual. Instead, this study 
demonstrates that there are innumerable factors that interdependently contribute to the 
arrival of the British and the global population at its current state.  
It is my hope that by understanding these factors it may become more clear the role that 










“Pointing to another world will never stop vice among us;  




















In the years since September 11, the state of Islamic extremism and the viability 
of terrorist threats have become common topics in global academic discourse on national 
and international security. In 2014 and the beginning of 2015, we have seen an escalation 
in the public conversation due to the threat of the Islamic State and the recent attacks in 
Australia, Africa, and France. Over the past decade, intellectuals have identified 
homegrown terrorism as a growing threat to the protection of national interests, and the 
case of ISIS, or ISIL, has offered the perfect example of its prevalence. Intelligence 
officials in the United States believe there are around 7,000 foreigners fighting with the 
militant group in Syria, though they have only been able to identify close to a dozen 
American citizens of those involved (Briggs 2014). It is estimated that of those foreign 
fighters, nearly 2,000 Europeans are fighting for the Islamic State, at least 400 of which 
were thought to be citizens of the United Kingdom as of October 2014 (Jamieson 2014). 
This number has since risen to an estimate of 20,000 foreign fighters overall with 600 
now believed to be British citizens (Sharma 2015). While it is heavily stressed that exact 
numbers and information on these foreign fighters are extremely difficult to verify at this 
time due to the nature of the conflict, the seemingly high number of participants from 
Britain has caused government concern.  
While current information concerning the Islamic State is unclear, it is widely 
recognized in the academic community that over the past few decades, the number of 
British sympathizers to Islamic terrorism has rivaled that of many of their Western 
counterparts, with the exception of France. Recent statistics show that five British 
citizens are leaving the country every week to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
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(Malik and Gardham 2014). It is now believed that twice as many Muslim British 
nationals are fighting for the militant group than are serving in the British Armed Forces 
(Grant and Sharkov 2014). In addition to those joining the Islamic State, others are 
known to have made connections with al Qaeda’s Al-Nusra Front and the Katiba al-
Muhajireen (RT UK 2014). The prevalence of British citizens in this issue has caused it 
to become an important area of investigation and debate among intellectuals in the United 
Kingdom and abroad. Why is it that British citizens in particular seem to be susceptible to 
Islamist radicalization when compared to nationals of other Western countries? Some cite 
profiling statistics of Islamist sympathizers in general, such as income level, education, 
mental disorders, religiosity, and more. Many blame a lack of integration of Muslim 
immigrant communities into British culture over the past fifty years, claiming British 
policy has been inefficient and dysfunctional in this regard. Others argue that the United 
Kingdom has long been considered a state that is relatively accepting of religious 
diversity and freedom, providing a safe haven in which radicalism was able to take root. 
While there are varying levels of analysis and theoretical lenses through which this issue 
may be analyzed, no single study has been viewed as complete in its conclusions.  
The research presented here will demonstrate that dysfunction in British society 
created the circumstances under which a rise of radicalization was able to take place. A 
period of high immigration in the second half of the 20th century disrupted the established 
functions of British society. The British government then proved unable to correct this 
disruption with effective policy reform, especially with regard to the integration of the 
Muslim immigrant community into the larger society and its institutions. This sustained 
dysfunction was exacerbated by international events involving the global Islamic 
 7 
community, creating a situation easily exploited by influential actors of Islamist 
extremism. Under these circumstances, the radicalization of British nationals was able to 






















Chapter 1: Methodology and Research Design 
 This research will take a highly interdisciplinary approach in its analysis, 
primarily consulting psychological research and theories of revolution and social 
systems, followed by a theoretically guided historical analysis. This will take place on 
three separate but overlapping levels of analysis: the societal, global, and individual.  
The primary independent variable studied here is the dysfunction in British 
society. In order to assess and measure the level of “dysfunction” in the country, this 
study will utilize Chalmers Johnson’s theory of revolution and his application of Talcott 
Parsons’ criteria for a well-functioning social system. These are “pattern maintenance”, 
“adaptation to the environment”, “goal attainment”, and “integration and social control”, 
each of which will be discussed in depth in the theoretical framework chapter.  
In demonstrating the presence of dysfunction through these “functional needs”, 
Johnson’s work will be further applied to explain how the British system arrived at such a 
state of dysfunction. This analysis requires a consideration of what Johnson referred to as 
changes to the “socioeconomic environment”, the “value structure”, and the relationship 
between the two, referred to in its ideal state as “homeostatic equilibrium”. Part of 
Johnson’s work involves a consideration of the exogenous and endogenous pressures that 
cause this relationship to become unbalanced; that is, forces originating externally or 
internally to the society, respectively. This will involve a discussion of globalization and 
the sources of change that have facilitated such an increase in cultural contact between 
Britain and other countries of the world.  
The third level of analysis, the consideration of the individual, will also be 
explored using Johnson’s theory, which describes the relationship between the system of 
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the human individual and the social system of which it is a member. While this has often 
been viewed as another independent variable, it will be analyzed here as one whose 
impact is dependent on the state of the previously mentioned variable of dysfunction. To 
gain further insight into how the individual interacts, influences, and is influenced by his 
or her environment in such a situation, the work of Ted Gurr and his theory of “relative 
deprivation” will be utilized alongside the work of various theorists of radicalization. 
While the radicalization theories will be given a separate section within the theoretical 
framework chapter, a discussion of how they complement and overlap with the work of 
Johnson, Parsons, and Gurr will be presented, ultimately demonstrating the consequential 
links between the global, the societal, and the individual in the process of radicalization.  
The global level of analysis is accounted for within the framework of Johnson’s 
theory, giving recognition to the amount of influence forces external to the society can 
have on domestic affairs and functions. This is accounted for in the discussion of 
“exogenous sources of change”, viewing these external forces as contributing to the rise 
of disequilibrium in the social system. Additionally, globalization, or the increased 
interaction and exchange of cultural products across state boundaries, has a profound 
influence on the dissemination of ideologies. The processes of globalization, then, create 
a direct link between the individual, societal, and global levels of analysis. This will be 
addressed in the sections on exogenous sources of change and that of the individual level 
in the British experience.  
Following a discussion and explanation of these theories and their relevance, they 
will be applied directly to the British case. Here it will be shown how the society arrived 
at its state of dysfunction, defining it through the terms of Johnson and Parsons, giving 
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examples of specific events and of the experience of the Muslim immigrant communities 
over the past fifty years. This will include a discussion of their marginalization, 
socioeconomic status, and relationship to the British government and its institutions. 
Next, an examination of the reaction of the British government to this dysfunction 
through policy change, implementation, and enforcement will be presented, discussing 
why such actions did or did not contribute to a correction of the social system.  
The ways in which the British Muslim community reacted to this dysfunction will 
follow, including an examination of their relationship with the larger society and then 
with the global community. This will include public opinion data from various years on 
the attitudes of British Muslims representing different generations toward issues such as 
discrimination, institutional efficiency, foreign policy, and cultural and religious identity. 
Additionally, an analysis of the role of educational institutions, religion, and global 
relationships will be necessary, each of which are factors that will connect the global and 
societal levels to individual experience. Using the psychological theories from the 
theoretical framework chapter of Ted Gurr and others, these factors will be explained in 
the context of the larger process of radicalization, demonstrating how individuals and 









Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
Theories of Revolution 
 Theorists of revolution have attempted to explain, through numerous methods and 
lenses of analysis, why movements for the overthrow of an existing power structure 
occur, how they occur, and what is necessary for their success. In this paper, terrorism 
will be considered as a strategy of revolution, meaning that a study of why and how 
revolutions occur can offer insight into how and why the rise of terrorist motivations has 
occurred in Britain over the course of the past half-century. However, it is important to 
first establish the type of revolutionary theory that will be utilized.  
Most theories of revolution focus on a specific component, such as actor-oriented 
theories. These look at what types of personalities and individual actors are likely to 
ascribe to revolutionary action and how they are able to influence a larger movement. 
Structural theories, on the other hand, focus on how normal individuals respond and react 
to unusual situations within certain political and social contexts. By focusing on certain 
variables, these theories have their strengths and weaknesses. Both can say much more 
about their area of expertise than other theories can, but they are only able to explain 
certain factors of revolution and not others. Structural theories often do not account for 
the role of individual diversity and require time as they are best applied retroactively, just 
as actor-oriented approaches are limited to their specific cases and are not easily applied 
cross-culturally. For example, the actor-oriented work of frustration-aggression 
hypotheses, including that of James C. Davies and Ted Gurr, explains very well how 
aggression arises from changing expectations, though it does not continue on to explain 
where this aggression will be directed or how. Structural theorists, such as Theda 
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Skocpol, Samuel Huntington, and Barrington Moore, explain political relationships, 
socioeconomic causes, and the influence of economic structure on revolutionary 
outcomes, respectively. Each has contributed valuable insight into the understanding of 
why men rebel, but independently they are unable to provide a full picture (Johnson 
1982, 171-178). 
 Other theorists have tried to avoid this isolation of variables, combining structural 
and actor-oriented views to create conjunction theories, such as that of Crane Brinton. 
These frameworks, and Brinton’s specifically, explain the process of revolution in stages, 
proposing that certain events occurring in a certain order lead to revolution. However, 
these explanations find difficulty in explaining the cases that do not fit perfectly into this 
progression. Additionally, they do not consider how each of these stages interact with and 
influence one another in any other order than that which is presented. Contingency 
theories, however, consider the strengths and weaknesses of conjunction theories and 
choose to emphasize the ways in which the influence of each of these commonly studied 
variables is contingent on what occurs to the others (Johnson 1982, 178-185). Chalmers 
Johnson offers one such theory, combining multiple levels of analysis to explain how a 
society arrives at a revolutionary situation and what is necessary for its progression to a 
revolutionary outcome. He proposes that a social system faced with internal and external 
pressures may eventually become dysfunctional, given their failure to evolve.  This 
disorients the behavior of the system’s members to the point that psychological 
processes, influenced by the structural dysfunction, lead some individuals to adopt 
ideologies defined by their motivation to rebel against the existing social system and 
replace it with another. In short, revolution is an act of desperation taken when the social 
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system fails at evolution. This explanation combines structural and psychological 
perspectives while accounting for the influence of external forces on internal affairs. 
Such an interdisciplinary and comprehensive theoretical framework is better able to 
provide a full understanding of the various factors involved in the unfolding of a 
revolutionary movement. 
 The case of Islamist terrorism itself is not regularly studied through the lenses of 
revolutionary theory. However, by Chalmers Johnson’s terms, it can be and should be 
considered as such, wherein a portion of the British citizenry has radicalized to rebel 
against existing political structures. The British citizens involved in this type of 
extremism have adopted what Johnson considers a “revolutionary ideology”, which will 
be discussed at length in this chapter. This involves an accepted “goal culture”, or the 
structure of society they would like to put in place, and a “transfer culture”, which 
involves accepted understandings of what must be done to reach the goal culture and how 
those actions can be carried out (Johnson 1982, 125-138). As we understand Islamist 
extremism today, the ultimate goal is the dissolution of those forms of government that 
are not based in the political model of Sharia law and their replacement with a global 
Islamic state (Mauro 2014). In this context, terrorism is a strategy of the revolutionary 
ideology these extremists have adopted (Johnson 1982, 152-168). As the case of British 
Islamic extremism can be understood as “revolutionary” by these terms, Johnson’s theory 
can place its development within a structural and global environment, each of which are 
necessary to fully understanding how such an initiative was able to grow within the 
British state.  
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The Social System 
Chalmers Johnson formulated an understanding of what a society is and how it is 
formed by consulting and critiquing various political, philosophical, and psychological 
pieces of work, such as those of Montesquieu, Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, Marx, Ralf 
Dahrendorf, Weber, Durkheim, and numerous others. What has resulted of this thorough 
research is a view of society as a “social system” composed of various independent but 
interacting variables (Johnson 1982, 41). The most important point Johnson makes about 
the structure of society is that it is not solely determined by a single force, as is believed 
by coercion theorists. Rather, it is also heavily influenced by a structure of values and its 
relationship to the socioeconomic environment (Johnson 1982, 20). These two 
independent variables interact to form the division of labor.  
Johnson posits that a human society is a “moral community” in which values, or 
“shared definitions of the situation”, are a variable that influences the society’s social 
organization and integration (Johnson 1982, 21). Values are essential to the social 
functioning of a society due to the ways in which they provide meaning for social action 
and explanations of reality (Johnson 1982, 26). Through this structure of values, roles are 
created that define the socially accepted responsibilities and privileges of any given 
individual. Such expectations allow members of the society to decide what actions they 
will take and how they can expect others to behave (Johnson 1982, 42). Roles, then, 
become the dynamic component of the division of labor and are regulated by role 
requirements, or norms. These norms are the guidelines for expected performance within 
a given role and are “inspired and legitimized” by the value structure, creating a range of 
acceptable social behavior within which socialized members of the society are expected 
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to act (Johnson 1982: 43). When the value structure and the socioeconomic environment 
are aligned, these norms will be a direct reflection of the values of the society, meaning 
that these “rules for behavior” will be respected naturally and rarely violated. If these two 
are not aligned, however, the instance of violation will increase, as the restrictions on 
behavior are no longer rooted in values (Johnson 1982, 44).  
A natural hierarchical structure will develop to organize these roles in order to 
avoid conflict in role differentiation and assignment. This order is itself a product of the 
value structure, because the position of a given role in relation to others is based on the 
societal value assigned to it. This static component of the division of labor is status, and 
such an organization is also dependent on the balanced relationship between the value 
structure and environment, much like societal norms (Johnson 1982, 45). These three 
components, roles, social organization, and status, are all products of the value-
environment relationship and make up the larger social system.  
As the efficacy of these three factors is dependent on the balance between the 
value structure and the socioeconomic environment, a well-functioning social system is 
considered to be in equilibrium where these variables are synchronized. When changes 
occur in one, a corresponding change must occur in the other if equilibrium is to be 
maintained (Johnson 1982, 57). A healthy system will enjoy a “homeostatic equilibrium”, 
where a societies norms, institutions, and roles interact in such a way that an issue in one 
may be corrected by another through “homeostatic processes”. Such a process is only 
possible when value sharing is present (Johnson 1982, 55). With these corrections, 
changes are being made to the social structure, though they are small and made without a 
direct intention. This type of change is considered “evolutionary” and is able to sustain 
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the state of equilibrium (Johnson 1982, 59). The possibility for changes that are unable to 
be corrected in this way lead us to a discussion of disequilibrium and what the system 
may become vulnerable to once this imbalance occurs.  
 
The Disequilibrated Social System 
 Various changes may occur to either the socioeconomic environment or to the 
value structure, causing their relationship to become unsynchronized. Johnson proposes 
two categories of sources for such change, endogenous (those changes originating within 
the system itself) and exogenous (those occurring as a result of cultural contact), each of 
which may impact either the environment or the value structure. An exogenous source of 
change to the value structure may stem from international communication, war relations, 
foreign political or religious actors and groups, and other forms of cultural contact 
(Johnson 1982, 67). However, an impactful exogenous change to the value structure often 
requires an exogenous change to the environment first, which makes the system more 
open and vulnerable to these outside influences. An exogenous change to the 
environment would include imported technologies, skills or medical knowledge, 
immigration, and international diplomatic relations (Johnson 1982, 72).  
 Endogenous sources of value change, on the other hand, primarily occur through 
creative innovations and intellectual developments that directly impact the value structure 
(Johnson 1982, 68). These should not be confused with technological innovations, which 
would be an exogenous source of environmental change. Endogenous impacts on either 
sphere, environment or values, however, are by nature mutually influencing. For 
example, a technological innovation may cause a change to the environment, which could 
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then cause a change in the value structure as a homeostatic process. Additionally, the 
acceptance and implementation of the innovation itself depends on the value structure, as 
it could just as easily be rejected. Internal innovations can also often be expected, as 
innovation itself is “routinized” by the social system to a certain extent, encouraging it in 
certain areas over others, such as the arts (Johnson 1982, 69). With this existing 
expectation, an impact significant enough to cause a substantial change to the value 
structure is less likely, unless it were to come from within a marginal and unexpected 
group (Johnson 1982, 70).  
 When changes such as these are able to push the value structure and environment 
out of synchronicity, the social system must still be able to perform certain functions if it 
is to maintain its existence. To explain these requirements, Johnson applies Talcott 
Parsons’ four “functional needs”, of which the fourth Johnson highlights as the most 
crucial to the study of revolutions. First, the society must ensure “pattern maintenance” or 
“socialization”, where new members of the system, such as children or immigrants, are 
instilled with its existing values and norms. This occurs primarily within the family, 
educational institutions, and day-to-day participation in society. The second need 
involves the social system’s “adaptation to the environment”. Through the established 
structure of roles and norms, various processes must occur in order to maintain the value 
structure-environment relationship. Roles must be created and assigned and resources 
must be distributed based on the value structure and the society’s anticipation of changes 
to the environment, for which it must be prepared to adjust.  
The third necessity laid out by Parsons is that of “goal attainment”. While a 
society as a whole has goals, often concerning its position relative to other societies, each 
 18
subset of that single system has particular goals, as well. Each actor and group of actors 
are motivated by various factors that will orient them toward certain ends, many of which 
will at times conflict with the ambitions of others or of the larger system. Therefore, the 
social system must operate in such a way that compromise and agreement is promoted, 
utilizing policy tools and management of resources to aid in the achievement of certain 
goals that satisfy the collective. Often, these compromises may be inauthentic, short-term 
solutions, but they must at least be able to mitigate disagreement for the time being.  
The fourth and final of Parsons’ requisites is “integration and social control”. 
Though similar to the imparting of values in the first need, this involves the perpetuation 
of a system’s values in order to allow for assimilation of the system’s members. This 
need may be achieved “positively” through institutions that aid value dissemination, such 
as art, religion, judicial proceedings, political and social work, etc. The exercise of 
authority, especially that of the state, may also achieve this “negatively” when it is 
necessary to control conflict and abnormal, or deviant, behavior (Johnson 1982, 53). 
Anthony Wallace spoke of the need for integration as well, saying that it is a need for the 
“organization of [human] diversity” rather than an insistence on uniformity. This relates 
back to the need for “goal attainment”, where the interests and backgrounds of diverse 
actors must be considered and processed to reach a compromise rather than conformity, 
in which the preservation of the system is the common goal. When this is true, diversity 
is accompanied by curiosity, rather than exclusion, which brings about trust in the social 
order.  
 While all four of these activities are necessary to the existence of the system, the 
fourth, “integration and social control”, is a vital component to the prevention of 
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rebellion (Johnson 1982, 53). During a period of disequilibrium, where the value 
structure and the socioeconomic environment are moving further and further out of synch 
with one another, integration becomes increasingly difficult. At this point, the system has 
come to a “power deflation”, where the “nondeviant”, socialized members of society 
believe less and less in the capacity of the system’s leadership to correct the imbalance 
(Johnson 1982, 95). During this period, rising rates of deviancy and dissemination of 
ideologies will make integration and social control increasingly important, as well 
(Johnson 1982, 94). The only solution is effective intervention on the part of the state, 
through policies and tactics that will bring the system back to equilibrium (Johnson 1982, 
54).  
First, the power-holding elite must acknowledge that there exists a need to 
resynchronize the system. If this does not occur, the power deflation will persist until it is 
acknowledged at a later time or authority is lost (Johnson 1982, 95). The ruling elite can 
take a variety of actions from this point, which Johnson characterizes as ranging from 
“conservative change” to “complete intransigence”. Conservative change involves the use 
of effective policy or other means that cause change through existing, institutionalized 
pathways of influence. This requires that the elite have a thorough understanding of the 
social environment and the ability to discern the parts of the value structure most 
important to the maintenance of the system (Johnson 1982, 96). The policies themselves 
will also fall on a spectrum from “barely adequate” to “demonstrably incompetent”. 
According to Johnson, the most common form of “barely adequate” policy involves a 
relaxation of social mobility norms. A state of disequilibrium often involves a “status 
protest”, where actors occupying their roles perceive that status is no longer value-
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derived, giving rise to resistance to the hierarchy (Johnson 1982, 45). When this 
opposition arises, it is often in the best interest of the elite to relax these norms of social 
mobility to include members of the protesting group. This method can potentially 
neutralize the group posing the greatest threat to the elite’s authority by easing social 
tension (Johnson 1982, 98).  
Incompetent policies will not be able to aid in realignment, though not because 
they are intentionally ineffective. Rather, policies of this sort are often the result of the 
elite’s isolation from the rest of the social network, giving them inadequate familiarity 
with the situation. Leadership can still acknowledge this incompetence and avoid 
revolution through abdication (Johnson 1982, 99). 
 At the opposite end of the spectrum from conservative change, the ruling elite 
may also choose to pass policies or take action that is in direct conflict with the existing 
value structure, aggravating the existing imbalance of the system to the point where it 
may serve to bring about revolution rather than prevent it. This is Johnson’s “elite 
intransigence” (Johnson 1982, 97). This carries a similar significance as a lack of elite 
acknowledgement or incompetent policy does as all three may lead to a complete loss of 
authority. Hannah Arendt and John Locke both considered the loss of authority to be the 
primary cause of revolution (Johnson 1982, 118). Johnson makes clear that it is an 
important factor, but does not weight it as heavily. He says that, when the socialized 
members of society have lost all faith in the competency of the system’s leadership, the 
relationship between the elite and the rest of society is based solely on “deterrence”.  
In the deterrence relationship, the elite’s power occupation becomes completely 
dependent on their use of force, of which they must maintain a monopoly. As long as 
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they are still able to control deviancy and protest behavior through force, though it may 
no longer be legitimate, they can remain in power without a revolution. This idea of 
legitimacy and authority is one that relies on the complementary relationship between the 
public and the elite, similar to the idea of social contract theory, where certain rights and 
responsibilities are reciprocally given (Johnson 1982, 117). As this relationship of 
authority and obedience is a product of the value system, it is already threatened when the 
system becomes disequilibrated and a power deflation arises. Once authority is lost, the 
position of leadership will become contingent on this monopoly of armed force, as it is 
the only source of power left to its disposal. 
 Due to this caveat, Johnson insists that the loss of authority is not the immediate 
cause of a successful rebellion or revolution. Instead, he and many other theorists agree 
that there must be an event that makes clear the loss of the elite’s monopoly of armed 
force, which Johnson refers to as “accelerators”. He finds that there are three types of 
accelerators. A display of military weakness or disorder will render the armed forces 
available to the power-holding elites ineffective. A second type involves a protesting 
group within the society coming to believe and have confidence in their ability to 
overcome whatever force the elite may exercise. Third, an opposition group may take 
strategic action against the elite because of their perception that certain factors have 
presented a timely opportunity. The most important accelerator, however, is considered 
by Johnson to be a loss in war, as it communicates the armed force’s ineffectiveness more 
acutely than some of the other possibilities (Johnson 1982, 101-106).  
 In short, Johnson’s contingency theory proposes that in a period of 
disequilibrium, when a power deflation is met with a loss of elite authority and an 
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accelerator that removes their remaining monopoly of armed force, revolution will occur. 
Here we can distinguish between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome. 
All that has been discussed up to this point brings the social system to a revolutionary 
situation. What the result of the revolution will be, or the revolutionary outcome, will 
depend on a variety of factors, many of which come into play during the revolutionary 
conflict itself. The research of this paper looks primarily at why a form of revolution was 
able to occur. As a result, the theoretical focus will be on the revolutionary situation and 
its origins rather than its outcome, seeing as this is still unknown and constantly 
unfolding at this very moment.  
 
Johnson on the level of the Individual 
 Johnson includes psychological theory in his work, acknowledging that the 
processes of cognitive change on the individual level are significant in the larger process 
of revolution. Due to a loss of equilibrium in the social system, individuals will become 
disoriented and attempt to cope with the imbalance in a variety of ways. In order to 
explore these cognitive processes, he consults Anthony Wallace, while making sure to 
highlight his theory’s shortcomings. Johnson grants that this theory is one of the most 
operable and clear representations of how psychological changes occur during a period of 
disequilibrium and states that its weaknesses are made up for when it is used along with 
the “macrosystemic” analysis presented previously (Johnson 1982, 114). 
 Johnson’s interpretation of Wallace’s theory fits quite well into the structural 
level of analysis that we have already discussed. It consists of four stages (“steady state”, 
“increased individual stress”, “cultural distortion”, and a “period of revitalization”) that 
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culminate in what Wallace refers to as “revitalization”, or revolution at the psychological 
level. “Steady state”, the first stage, is what Johnson refers to as equilibrium in the social 
system. Here, deviant or criminal behavior occurs within acceptable limits and only in 
those individuals who are unable to cope with normal stresses to the system due to social 
or physical deficiencies, such as incomplete socialization or mental illness. The second 
stage, “increased individual stress”, arises when the same endogenous or exogenous 
sources of change discussed in the previous section influence the value structure or 
environment and cause disequilibrium. Johnson’s interpretation of this stage characterizes 
individual behavior as being only slightly more abnormal, where such behavior may even 
go unrecognized due to increasingly blurry understandings of crime and deviancy. Rather 
than deviant behavior, the most important manifestation of stress is an increase in the 
formulation of new ideologies. This occurs as more and more people seek ways in which 
to make sense of and correct the disorientation felt from the systemic imbalance.  
 “Cultural distortion” is the third stage, in which the pressures of the second stage 
reach a point where the impact on individual behavior is obvious. Members of society 
continue to adopt increasingly dysfunctional ways to restore “personal equilibrium” and, 
gradually, align themselves with various ideologies that begin to create social divisions. 
This stage may be the first visibly apparent change in a radicalization process from an 
outside perspective. The fourth stage is the “period of revitalization”. Due to the 
heightened levels of imbalance of the system, conservative change, while still possible, 
becomes increasingly difficult to achieve. As a result of this difficulty, it is most likely 
that the system will undergo revitalization or simply disintegrate (Johnson 1982, 112). 
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 This fourth stage of revitalization is the most dynamic, particularly on the 
psychological level, and for this reason Wallace proposes five “requisite functions” 
within it, all of which are necessary for a complete change of the social system to occur. 
First, a revolutionary ideology must be constructed, or what Wallace refers to as the 
“formulation of a code”. This is necessary because it offers a “transfer culture” and a 
“goal culture” to the individuals unsettled by disequilibrium. The goal culture proposes a 
replacement for the now dysfunctional existing order. It functions as a possibility for 
change that can free the members of society from the pressures under which they 
currently are struggling. The transfer culture, then, offers the method through which they 
will be able to arrive at this change.  
 Once this ideology is created, it must be communicated throughout the society by 
its “formulators” with the goal of converting others and gaining followers. The actors in 
this second requirement have undergone varying degrees of psychological change, or 
what Wallace refers to as changes to the personal “mazeway”. Those that created the 
ideology, the “formulators”, go through “mazeway resynthesis”: a change in thought and 
understanding that is considered irreversible. These individuals are most like religious 
prophets who are secure in their faith and practice and unlikely to experience a radical 
reformulation of their beliefs. Those that are converted by these individuals, on the other 
hand, experience “hysterical conversion”, where their psychological change is likely to 
have more rapid, emotionally driven, and ongoing. This type of change is more easily 
reversed and therefore requires regular encouragement (Johnson 1982, 114).  
 Once the ideology has become the core of the relationship between the 
formulators, the converts, and the followers, this system of relationships becomes 
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organized hierarchically, often with a charismatic leader symbolizing the cause. After this 
third requisite has been adequately achieved, the transfer culture is able to develop into 
an actual strategy, orienting the actions of the organized ideological group towards the 
goal culture. This fourth requirement is called “adaptation”. Here, the group makes clear 
its antagonism toward their ideologically defined enemy and those that claim to be a 
subscriber to the ideology while failing to fully participate. These four factors allow for 
the commencement of “cultural transformation”, or the official attempt to put the transfer 
culture into effect (Johnson 1982, 112).  
 Strategy, or the transfer culture, is a part of a revolutionary movement that carries 
a great deal of significance, not only in how it will impact the revolutionary outcome, but 
also in what it says about the relationship of the revolting group to the power-holding 
elites. Johnson expands on this point within his emphasis on accelerators at the advent of 
a revolution, a concept Wallace does not address. A strategy, according to Johnson, is the 
result of a “rational calculation” of the capabilities of the elites and the force available for 
them to utilize. This calculation allows for the formulation of courses of action to 
neutralize their defensive efforts (Johnson 1982, 140). Based on this tactical 
understanding of the situation, a strategy can often determine what the accelerator, or 
immediate cause of the revolution, will be. For example, Johnson says that a sufficient 
accelerator may be the perception on the part of the revolutionaries that they have the 
ability or an opportunity to weaken or overcome the elite’s monopoly of force (Johnson 
1982, 138). In order for this perception to even occur, the revolutionaries must have had 
some prior idea of what was required for this to be true, which necessitates a 
premeditated strategy and observation. A strategy can take the form of a coup d’état, 
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guerrilla warfare, terrorism, or many others. The last of these will become a primary 
concern later on in this paper.  
 Returning to Wallace’s psychological analysis, if this fifth requirement of 
revitalization, “cultural transformation”, is successful, a period of “routinization” must 
follow. In order to make the change of the system permanent, the members must 
assimilate a new value structure and accepted division of labor. This can then become 
stabilized if it achieved a new state of equilibrium, meaning that the system returns to 
Wallace’s first stage of “steady state”.  
 Wallace explains this process of psychological change with a basic, underlying 
“principle of conservation of cognitive structure”. Essentially, an actor in a society, 
though faced with the pressures of disequilibrium and recognizing the system’s 
dysfunction, will maintain their conception of reality unless they have the opportunity to 
create a new one or are presented with an ideology that offers a viable replacement. Until 
this switch occurs, and as long as disequilibrium persists, they will react to societal 
stressors with anxiety and denial (Johnson 1982, 114-115). This highlights the 
importance of ideology in the development of a revolutionary movement. The instance of 
disequilibrium places psychological and sociological pressure on individual members that 
makes the formulation and adoption of alternative ideologies more meaningful and more 
likely. This ideology can unite previously dispersed members into a single, goal-oriented 
group that, with a formulated strategy, is capable of posing a viable revolutionary threat 
to the power-holding elites whose authority has been lost.  
 Chalmers Johnson, with the help of existing literature on social systems theory, 
psychology, and political philosophy, combines the structural (disequilibrium), global 
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(exogenous sources of change), and individual levels of analysis to form a contingency 
theory of revolution. Each framework explains a different component of revolution that, 
when combined, are better able to explain their interdependence. One without the other 
will give only an incomplete understanding. In keeping with this approach, it is 
constructive to consider more recent theories of radicalization. By examining these in 
relation to Johnson, we can identify where they overlap and complement one another, 
allowing for a more comprehensive examination of the circumstances of Islamist 
terrorism today.  
 
Theories of Radicalization 
 One of the most researched topics relating to terrorism seeks to understand who 
terrorists are. Where do they come from? Do they share certain qualities that predispose 
them to violent action later in life? Are there psychological explanations for their 
movement to violence? Many scholars have devoted their studies to creating a profile for 
terrorists, or a “Terrorist Personality,” revealing the “psychological forces” that move 
them to violent action (Sageman 2004, 69). These are the stereotypes common to a 
Western understanding of an Islamic terrorist, for example, that most are poor and 
desperate, from third world countries, relatively uneducated and therefore more 
vulnerable to “brainwashing and recruitment” (Sageman 2004, 80). However, studies 
have shown that these types of generalizations actually tend to be incorrect and a 
“terrorist personality” has struggled to find support through empirical analyses (Sageman 
2008, 16). Therefore, scholars such as Marc Sageman claim that one is not predisposed to 
be a terrorist, but rather there is a process influenced primarily by “social, economic, 
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political, cultural, and historical factors” (2008, 21) in which an individual’s experiences 
take place (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008).  
 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko define radicalization as a “change in 
beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence 
and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group” (2008, 416). It is important to recognize 
that radicalization is a process, and not a single decision (Sageman 2004, 61-98; King 
and Taylor 2011). King and Taylor contribute to this discourse by presenting five 
theoretical models popular among radicalization scholars and analyze their similarities 
and differences. Four of the five of these models are linear and progressive while the fifth 
shows four interacting factors. All five, however, acknowledge that radicalization occurs 
progressively (2011). 
 McCauley and Moskalenko present this process in a pyramid model in which base 
sympathizers are located at the bottom and the higher levels of the pyramid contain fewer 
members with increased levels of radicalization of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors (2008, 
417). This brings the question of how an individual moves from the base of the pyramid 
to the apex.  
 As discussed, many scholars acknowledge that there are psychological factors at 
play within structural conditions that contribute to this process. It is now commonly 
acknowledged that terrorist subjects should be acknowledged as “normal” and rational 
human beings rather than psychologically troubled individuals, as evidence for a 
correlation between radicalization and these abnormalities has not been found (McCauley 
and Moskalenko 2008). This can be explained through the role of the traditional terrorist 
network, which promotes its best interest by being highly selective in its recruitment. It is 
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not helpful to their objectives if they accept individuals that are irrational and 
psychologically troubled. Rather, they look for highly intelligent individuals that are also 
extremely devoted to their cause (Sageman 2004, 61-98).  
Additionally, Johnson speaks to this in his work, stating that “revolution is 
purposeful, goal-oriented behavior, intended to overcome dissynchronization” (Johnson 
1982, 114). It is the actors that are considered socialized and non-deviant under 
circumstances of equilibrium that are disoriented when the system becomes 
dysfunctional. It is their rationality and cognizance that motivates them to find means by 
which they can correct their situation, of which the elected solution may be the adoption 
of a radical ideology.  
Taking this assumption of rationality into account, McCauley and Moskalenko 
identify different levels of radicalization: individual, group, and mass radicalization 
(2011). For the purpose of this theoretical overview, I will focus on the individual and 
group levels. At the individual level, there are certain factors that are considered to be 
crucial to this progressive personal change. The majority of individuals involved in 
terrorism first find themselves in a situation of isolation or social alienation. An example 
would be the experience of being a second or third generation immigrant living in a 
Western country. Here, the individual feels a crisis of identity in trying to reconcile both 
their religious and/or ethnic identity and further integration into Western culture 
(Sageman 2004, 93; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Weimann 2012; King and Taylor 
2011).  
This state of personal crisis is one identified among King’s work as common to 
many of the models considered, along with an experience of “relative deprivation”. 
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According to King, relative deprivation is the perception (not necessarily the reality) of 
being deprived relative to others, promoting feelings of injustice. This is not restricted to 
material possessions, but can occur in varying levels of social goods, such as rights and 
institutional protection. Sageman, who claims this experience is probably a necessary 
condition for terrorism, says this perceived deprivation leads to frustration resulting in 
aggression (2004, 95). King differentiates between personal and group-based relative 
deprivation, where group-based is a “stronger predictor of collective action and prejudice 
toward other groups” (King and Taylor 2011, 606).  
 In order to explain the importance of this deprivation among a group, we must 
first look at how an individual comes to find others with whom they share their 
discontent. King and Taylor found that a second factor in four of the five models is the 
acquisition of a group or socialization (2011). McCauley and Moskalenko discuss this 
socialization at length, claiming that it is crucial to the radicalization process (2008). 
Individuals feeling isolated and experiencing personal crises seek out companionship and 
validation of their feelings of discontent through like-minded people (King and Taylor 
2011, 606). One commonly studied example is that of Islamic religion, in which the 
isolated individual in a Western country finds companionship in a religious context with 
those that share their experiences or background on some level (Sageman 2004, 93). 
After joining this group, members are further radicalized through “group extremity shift,” 
a gradual increase in agreement among group members moving toward “increased 
extremity on whichever side of the opinion is favored by most individuals before 
discussion” (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 422). This shift leads to greater group 
cohesion, creation of a collective identity, increased trust, and increased isolation of the 
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group from the greater society (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Sageman 2004, 149). 
Sageman refers to this retreat from society as a lack of “embeddedness,” or decreased 
connections between members of the group and their larger environment, forming their 
own “imagined community” (Sageman 2004, 147-149). In the context of global Islamic 
terrorism, “lack of embeddedness of the networks in any society allowed dramatic shifts 
in the ideological focus of the jihad movement in response to changing social conditions” 
(Sageman 2004, 150).  
 It is evident through the work of these scholars that the radicalization process on 
the individual level usually occurs in the context of group radicalization as well. It is the 
formation of these highly cohesive groups that creates the necessary conditions for 
joining a formal terrorist network or cause.  
 
Ted Gurr: Communal Conflict 
 Following the success of his highly regarded book Why Men Rebel and his theory 
of relative deprivation, Ted Gurr has continued his studies of conflict. In a study 
published in 1993, he presented his findings on “Why Minorities Rebel” which explored 
the circumstances of political protest and rebellion by communal groups through 
statistical analysis. Using data collected on 227 communal groups from around the world, 
including indicators of group identity, disadvantages, grievances, and political action, 
Gurr was able to identify certain trends that help explain the circumstances under which 
they are more likely to rebel (1993).  
 Gurr acknowledges commonly held definitions of “communal groups”, those that 
view them as being based on sets of “genetic, cultural, linguistic, and religious givens, in 
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contrast to the states that govern them, which are held to be artificial entities established 
and maintained by coercion” (Gurr 1993, 162). Gurr adds to this understanding, saying 
that this collective identity is situational and may change when its circumstances do. For 
example, he states that external challenges, much like the endogenous sources of change 
discussed under Johnson, cause group identities to become more “salient”, whereas they 
are weakened under strong mechanisms of integration. Group identities are politically 
salient when they are subject to “systematic discriminatory treatment” or when political 
mobilizations arise to defend or promote interests that they are strongly associated with, 
such as minority rights movements (Gurr 1993, 163).  
 Gurr found that group disadvantages, including poverty, discrimination, and 
relative political or economic deprivation, are correlated with grievances and demands for 
political rights and also weakly correlated with protest behavior (Gurr 1993, 188). 
However, he finds that these disadvantages more often serve as the subjects used by 
leaders to garner support for a movement, saying that it is easiest to do so when the 
degree of disadvantage is high. In other words, rather than disadvantages serving as the 
immediate cause of rebellion, they more often serve as the foundation for new ideologies 
that are then able to encourage rebellion.  
 Gurr also finds it necessary to place these communal groups in political contexts, 
where he finds that institutionalized and well-established democracies will see more 
nonviolent activism among these groups, while states that are still in the process of 
democratizing are more likely to see protest and rebellion. In order to explain rebellious 
or revolutionary behavior among minority groups in established democracies, we can turn 
to Johnson. In his interpretation of Anthony Wallace’s psychological theory, Johnson 
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says that when revitalization occurs, those individuals participating have exhausted all 
other possibilities for correcting their disorientation available within the existing social 
and political structure (Johnson 1982, 110-12). Therefore, a well-established democracy 
that fails to provide practical solutions to disoriented behavior under disequilibrium, such 
as legitimate forms of nonviolent protest to which the state is responsive, rebellious or 
revolutionary behavior may become more likely. 
 
The Importance of “Cliques” 
 As has been discussed, group identities and dynamics are an active component of 
the radicalization process. Becoming a member of these groups is an important step on 
the path to dedicating oneself to terrorist agendas. Sageman refers to these collectives as 
“cliques,” “dense networks” formed locally that are based on “face-to-face encounters, 
attraction, and development of long-term bonds” (2004, 152). However, these 
relationships are not yet global. What is important to understand about the significance of 
being part of a smaller group first is that the incentive for “free riding” is significantly 
lower when “each member and each member’s behavior is know to others,” so a smaller 
group context is conducive to an individual finding the motivation to commit terrorist 
actions (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 417). This falls in line with Wallace’s 
requisite of “adaptation” during his revitalization stage, in which the revolutionary group 
not only becomes hostile toward their defined enemy, but also toward potential traitors 
within their ideology (Johnson 1982, 113). This makes the convert, still undergoing 
“hysterical conversion”, less likely to revert their ideological transformation and abandon 
the group. As the group has retreated significantly from society and a certain level of 
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group cohesion has been reached, the interpersonal devotion within the group reduces the 
tendency for “free riding” within the greater terrorist agenda and creates a psychological 
and emotional barrier for leaving the group once they have radicalized (McCauley and 
Moskalenko 2008, 422).  
Where, then, does the larger terrorist organization or network come into play? The 
greater terrorist networks are formed through complex social connections, but the 
instance of active recruitment techniques has not been shown to be very common 
(Sageman 2004, 121-122). Rather, “recruitment” often occurs through this cohesive 
group, where a member has a connection, whether personal or indirect, to the 
organization or their ideology, and the group chooses to seek out membership in the 
terrorist network collectively (Sageman 2004, 112). Political Scientist Donatella della 
Porta has referred to this process as “block recruitment” (McCauley and Moskalenko 
2008, 421).  
While the intricacies of specific terrorist networks are fascinating and of 
particular interest today, this paper is more interested in how the subject moves from 
being a member of society to reaching the point where they are attempting to join the 
terrorist cause. For this reason, the details of the networks themselves will not be a focus. 
 
The Role of Religion 
 The explanation that religion plays a crucial role in the radicalization process has 
come under intense scrutiny over the past few decades, especially when related 
specifically to the practice of Islam. Identifying this factor as significant does not mean 
that all people that practice religion, or all those that are Islamic, will become terrorists. 
 35
Historically, religion has been a common unifying factor that has motivated conflict and 
war carried about by any number of different religious groups for centuries. What is 
significant here is the role religion in general plays on psychological and social processes. 
In a study of homegrown terrorists in the US and the UK, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and 
Laura Grossman found that of the indicators for radicalization they identified, only one 
was found in the majority of their subjects, even when other factors were absent. This 
was the expression of radical political views, and was actually found to be a prerequisite 
to religious factors (2009, 8). This suggests that it is not religion alone that predisposes 
individuals to radicalization, but it is the politicization of their religious views that is 
significant. This politicized religious view falls under the definition of an ideology by 
Johnson’s terms, as it contains certain political and social goals framed by an existing 
theology. In order to understand what causes a religious individual to ascribe to a 
political ideology such as this, it is necessary to analyze the historical and cultural factors 











Chapter 3: Contextual Analysis 
Britain in Disequilibrium 
 As can now be understood through Chalmers Johnson’s theory of revolution, a 
society that reaches a state of disequilibrium is experiencing a break in the synchronicity 
of its value structure and socioeconomic environment. According to Johnson, this can 
occur through either endogenous or exogenous sources of change to one or both of these 
variables. In the British case, there are many examples of forces both internal and 
external to the country that had an impact on the experience of social and political life 
during the second half of the twentieth century. The most influential, and what will be 
primarily examined here, are the exogenous sources, to which internal changes were a 
reaction. These include the forces of immigration, international wars and conflict, 
interaction with outside cultures and actors, and the arrival of various religious clerics 
and their ideas. The following will demonstrate these changes with various examples.  
 
Exogenous Sources of Change 
Immigration 
Following the end of World War II, immigration to the United Kingdom sharply 
increased. Contributing to this influx were labor shortages, relatively few controls on 
immigration, and the provisions of the British Nationality Act of 1948, allowing for free 
entry of citizens of Commonwealth nations. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, many British 
immigrants entered from India and Pakistan, primarily due to hopes for greater economic 
opportunity. Later on in the 1970s, thousands of Asian immigrants were allowed into 
Britain following their expulsion from African countries due to harsh implementation of 
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‘Africanization’ policies (Abbas 2010, 20). As a result of immigration over the course of 
these few decades, the British Muslim population sharply increased. It is estimated that in 
the early 1900s there were close to 10,000 Muslims living in Britain (BBC 2009). Today, 
there are about 2.8 million Muslims, making up 4.6% of the British population (Pew 
Research Center 2014). Most of these citizens either immigrated during this period or are 
descended from those who did, as immigration controls implemented in the years directly 
following their arrival stemmed the flow substantially. 
As the immigrant population increased, various demonstrations of violence and unrest 
related to racial discrimination arose, which, falling under the category of “deviancy” by 
Johnson’s terms, are indicators of disequilibrium. This suggests that the “homeostatic 
processes” that Johnson finds characteristic of healthy social systems were not able to 
correct the impact of immigration on the society and bring it back to equilibrium. 
Johnson claims that this process is only possible when the population is still capable of a 
certain degree of value sharing, something made extremely difficult when multiple 
cultural backgrounds pour into a single framework over a short period of time. 
Anticipating social and political costs, it was clear that immigration reform was 
necessary. In 1962, the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced 
controls to immigration of Commonwealth citizens and required the possession of work 
vouchers for entry. Throughout the next few years, growing support for further 
immigration controls led to a lower number of available work vouchers and to the second 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1968. This legislation introduced even stricter 
regulations, requiring immigrants to provide proof of their familial relationship with a 
current citizen or someone that was born in Britain (either a parent or grandparent) and 
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largely disqualifying many of the previously permitted Commonwealth citizens (The 
National Archives 2014). The Immigration Act of 1971 increased the strength of controls, 
switched from a voucher system to work permits, allowing only for temporary residency, 
and offered assistance in the repatriation process were citizens interested in pursuing it. 
This series of immigration reforms can be considered forms of conservative change, 
demonstrating that the British government became aware of the disequilibrium caused by 
the high rates of immigration and chose to take political action. The policies the state 
chose to pursue also show a slow movement in the direction of a conservative political 
outlook on immigration.  
Globalization 
When integration was first acknowledged as an issue requiring priority in the 
wake of such a high level of immigration, there was an assumption among British 
politicians that the immigrant populations would naturally assimilate to some degree. 
After the immigrant generation, subsequent British-born individuals would easily be 
integrated into British society, attending school, learning English as a primary language, 
and living in areas of ethnic diversity. However, this assumption did not consider issues 
of group identity and the extent to which these individuals could potentially identify with 
their country of origin (Abbas 2010). Understandably overlooked was the impact 
technological innovation would have on the availability of affordable travel, fast and 
free-flowing communication, and easily accessible information (Brighton 2007, 13). This 
ability to connect with others across long distances has facilitated the creation of a global 
community independent of geographic boundaries, much like those characteristic to the 
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contemporary radicalization process. This will be discussed in the section considering the 
individual level in the British context.  
 
Endogenous Sources of Change 
The Thatcher Era 
 Under the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from 1975 to 1990, 
many changes in state policy further impacted the disequilibrium of the British system 
from within. Most notably were changes in the state’s approach to the economy and 
welfare in the midst of a damaging recession. One of the most significant changes seen in 
Thatcher’s administration was the implementation of the technological and productive 
innovations of the time, both exogenous sources of change to the environment, which 
began a reform of the country’s industrial operations. While this meant higher 
productivity, and a lessening of the gap between the production levels of Britain and 
other countries in the region, it also contributed to a sharp rise in unemployment and 
income inequality (Cassidy 2013).  
 The unemployment rate in the U.K. averaged 3.3 percent between 1980 and 1995. 
This average rose to 9.7 percent between 1980 and 1995, demonstrating that the policies 
and reforms of the Thatcher era had lasting consequences on joblessness in the country 
(Cassidy 2013). Unemployment was felt disproportionately for different groups and made 
worse by the increased incidence of homelessness due to the deregulation of housing and 
cuts to social security (Farrall 2006, 260-261). This range of impacts contributed to an 
impressive rise in poverty, with the rate jumping from 13.4 percent in 1979 to 22.2 
percent in 1990, the final year of Margaret Thatcher’s time as prime minister (Cassidy 
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2013). Thatcher also led a movement toward more strict requirements for income support 
eligibility, which is considered by many to have deepened social divisions and 
experiences of deprivation while prolonging the experience of poverty (Farrall 2006). 
 With regard to the rise in inequality, Stephen Farrall, a scholar of sociology and 
law, argues that the rise in the period between 1979 and 1985 was primarily a result of 
the increased unemployment seen throughout the country. However, from 1985 to 1990, 
this gap continued to grow due to government policy (Farrall 2006, 263), which would 
support Johnson’s assertion that disequilibrium and a resulting power deflation will be 
prolonged and exacerbated by inadequate policy change.  
As will be further explained in a later section, these changes in the social and 
economic structure of the British system during this period impacted some groups more 
severely than others. Ethnic minorities, especially, carried this burden, which came to be 
framed by Thatcher’s publically expressed negative and harsh views of immigration and 
the marginal communities it had created (Farrall 2006, 264). With knowledge of the 
contempt this administration had for these groups, it is understandable that a contentious 
relationship would arise and continue to breed distrust throughout the following decades. 
This lack of trust often leads to a loss of authority for the ruling elites among the 







Conservative Change and the Loss of Authority 
Multiculturalism in Britain 
 With the recognition that immigration controls were necessary also came the need 
to establish ways in which these new British citizens could easily integrate into society; 
action that, if successfully executed, would fulfill Talcott Parsons’ previously discussed 
four functional needs. Beginning in the 1960s, a discourse emerged among the British 
government and its politicians about the implementation of multiculturalism policies. 
Multiculturalism is based on the promotion of integration as a process involving both the 
majority population of the country and the minority groups in question. This process 
requires that both groups acknowledge their distinct cultural backgrounds, rather than 
focusing on racial differences, and accept that they share equal statuses of citizenship. 
Both sides are meant to participate in a reciprocal relationship where it is the 
responsibility of the majority community and “established society” (or the existing 
institutions of the country) to facilitate immigrant integration as much as it is the 
responsibility of the immigrants themselves. Following the ideology presented by Home 
Secretary Roy Jenkins in a speech he delivered in 1966, this process of integration should 
not cause all citizens to conform to a single idea of British citizenship, but rather it should 
create a shared space in which cultural diversity exists in an environment of "equal 
opportunity” and “mutual tolerance” (Brighton 2007, 5).  
 Multiple British governments following the 1970s expressed the idea that 
multiculturalism was an ultimate goal for society, though clear legislation on the national 
level acknowledging this plan was never created. Instead, control of the concept was left 
to local governments and departments concerned with varying social policy initiatives 
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(Brighton 2007, 6). Tariq Modood, one critic of British implementation of 
multiculturalism, has said that this initiative can only be successful if it is seen as an issue 
of “pluralistic integration” where the integration process is accepted as being distinct for 
each group rather than conceptualizing a single pathway for everyone to follow. He says 
that these cultures must remain permanently separate from one another in a political 
space where each group is able to communicate their concerns through representatives 
that can sufficiently contribute to their being understood, recognized and protected by the 
larger institutional framework (Brighton 2007, 6). 
Therefore, suitable institutions and the government must play an active role in 
ensuring that multiculturalism is successfully being pursued. Using Parsons’ ideas, this 
means that “socialization” of the immigrant population and their children would require 
an institutional framework to encourage and facilitate daily interaction and adoption of 
common values through multicultural schooling, social opportunities, and, more 
personally, through family dynamics. To allow for Parsons’ “adaptation to the 
environment”, the establishment of these institutions would necessarily involve the 
restructuring of roles to include these new members, socially and economically, which 
would in turn lead to changes in the status hierarchy and societal norms. Following these 
changes to the division of labor, “goal attainment” would still require that political 
institutions grant inclusion of the immigrant community and proof that their concerns are 
being considered on the local and national level. The most significant of Parsons’ 
requirements, “integration and social control”, would similarly rely on the system’s 
institutions in order for value sharing across these cultural and ethnic divides to be 
maintained (Johnson 1982).  
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It is arguable that these necessary links between the Muslim immigrant population 
and these institutions were either not present or were inadequate leading up to the turn of 
the century, especially with regard to policies protecting Muslim identity within the 
context of British citizenship. Various events throughout the final decades of the 20th 
century demonstrate these shortcomings and reveal a possible explanation for the lack of 
Muslim integration seen today. 
Racial and Ethnic Discrimination 
 Through his historical analysis of various events in British history since the 
decades of high immigration following World War II, Shane Brighton demonstrates that 
the issue of multiculturalism has only shown to be an issue for the central government in 
times of crisis (Brighton 2007, 6). One issue of particular significance is the historically 
contentious relationship between the British police and minority populations throughout 
the second half of the 19th century. One of the most notable examples is that of the 
Brixton Riots of 1981. Throughout the 1970s, an issue of growing public concern was the 
perceived criminality of the poor Black communities throughout London. The urban 
police force answered this concern for black crime with increasingly aggressive policing 
in these neighborhoods, utilizing ‘sus’ laws (an informal term that originated from 
“suspected person” [Oxford English Dictionary 2015]) permitting them to arrest 
individuals solely on the basis of their suspecting imminent criminal activity. In 1981, 
plainclothes officers stopped 1,000 people and arrested 150 over a ten-day period in 
Brixton in what was called “Operation Swamp”. The community responded with two 
days of violent protest, drawing international attention (Jefferson 2012, 8). Lord Scarman 
famously responded to the riots with the Scarman Report, commissioned by then Home 
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Secretary William Whitelaw, in which he found that the riots were a spontaneous 
response to widespread distrust and resentment of the police, largely due to their 
consistently heavy and aggressive presence in these lower-income Black neighborhoods 
around the city of London. His recommendations that there be changes in police training 
and methods of enforcement, as well as increased recruitment of ethnic minority officers 
(BBC 2004), was well-received by the British Afro-Caribbean community because it 
acknowledged this “state-sanctioned discrimination” as a barrier to further integration 
into British society (Brighton 2007, 6-7).  
 Elimination of the ‘sus’ laws occurred shortly after, but the police were able to 
gain stop and search powers in the following years through new acts and policies, under 
which they were able to continue their disproportionate policing of Asian and Black 
citizens, especially youth (Jefferson 2012, 8). This lead to further violent demonstrations 
by the Asian and Black populations throughout the following decades, demonstrating that 
despite acknowledgement of the issue of institutional racism in the Scarman Report, the 
country failed to implement effective reforms. The same issues were identified in the 
investigations following the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993, and a similar lack of 
reform followed (Jefferson 2008, 9). The inability of the government to answer these 
instances of “status protest” with any type of political action is an example of their failure 
to institute conservative change by Johnson’s standards. By his model, we can expect a 
power deflation to increase among these communities as a result of this inaction.  
 In the spring and summer of 2001, violent and large-scale protests by minority 
groups emerged in the areas of Bradford, Oldham and Burnley, once again drawing 
international attention to racial discrimination within these communities. Numerous 
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investigations were commissioned in response, including the Cantle report, which 
attributed the unrest to high levels of segregation and a lack of ethnic diversity in these 
areas, arguing that the people of Britain were living “parallel and polarized lives” (BBC 
2001). The reports made recommendations on how the issue should be handled by policy 
reform, especially with regard to education, housing, political leadership, and youth 
clubs, pointing specifically at the issue of faith-based schooling. The government and the 
Home Office acknowledged the issues at hand and expressed a need for greater 
identification with a common British citizenship (BBC 2001).  
These towns are just a few of the many post-industrial communities throughout 
the country that have highly isolated Muslim populations. During the period of high 
immigration following World War II, these industrial towns attracted Muslim immigrants 
to job opportunities, like those provided by the mills in the town of Dewsbury. Though 
these mills were shut down and many jobs were lost, the majority of these immigrant 
families remained. In Dewsbury itself, more than 80% of the population was still Muslim 
as of 2008. The town houses one of the largest mosques in all of Britain, considered to be 
the base of the organization Tablighi Jammat, which MI5 has long suspected of being 
connected with terrorist activity. One of the bombers involved in the 7/7 bombings in 
London in 2005 is known to have frequented this mosque, and many other supporters of 
the group across Europe have been linked to various terrorist plots (Watson 2008, 78-79).  
An Islamic school in the town that is linked to the mosque was investigated in 
2005 out of concern for the quality of education that it was providing to its pupils. It was 
found to be deficient in the instruction of “National Curriculum subjects”, giving a much 
greater priority to religious instruction (Watson 2008, 79). This is not entirely surprising, 
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due to the religious homogeneity and the relative isolation of the town from the larger 
British society. Most of the Muslims in Dewsbury are Deobandis, practicing a branch of 
Islam that is linked to the Taliban and ideals of Islamic purism. Fundamentalist 
Deobandis believe that it is necessary to separate themselves from the lives of non-
Muslims as much as possible, making the visible segregation between the community and 
the rest of Britain a product forces internal and external to the town itself. Including the 
school in Dewsbury, there were 27 Deobani schools in the UK as of 2008 (Watson 2008, 
79-80). This case is only one example of the experience of many similar communities 
throughout the country. 
In the years following the 2001 protests, a wide rejection of multiculturalism 
spread through the political community and the government began promoting a 
commonly recognized British identity in its place. Home Secretary David Blunkett 
explained this new initiative by stating that there are “norms of acceptability” in Britain 
and “those who come into our home—for that is what it is—should accept those norms” 
(Joppke 2004). This shift in rhetoric, coupled with the national attention given to ethnic 
minorities in the wake of the 2001 protests and 9/11, could be considered a form of 
intransigence on the part of the government as it arguably did more to single out these 
groups than it did to promote integration, creating a discourse focused on differences and 
the need to mitigate them rather than the creation of social cohesion and protection of 
individual liberties.  
Social and Economic Disadvantage 
 As Shane Brighton discusses in his work, despite efforts to implement policies to 
eliminate discrimination of minority populations in employment opportunities, 
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unemployment is still disproportionately higher in these groups. While there is evidence 
that minority groups experience social and economic disadvantages in general, additional 
data shows the situation of Muslim communities in particular may be significant. 
Elevated rates of poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion have been observed 
among the British Muslim population since their initial immigration in the second half of 
the 20th century. Data from a 2001 census showed that Muslims had the highest rates of 
disability and health problems of all religious groups, as well as an unemployment rate of 
15% (17.5% for Muslims between the ages of 16 and 24). The same census showed that 
around 38% of Muslims lived within the city of London and were “highly concentrated 
spatially” in all the areas in which they were established (Reed 2005, 4).  
In addition, a 2005 study showed that Muslims, particularly of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi origin, consistently perform much worse in communication, language and 
literacy tests than other ethnic groups, with their academic attainment level resting 
significantly under the national average (Reed 2004, 6). However, it is worth noting that 
Muslim participation in higher education is on the rise, and in 2005 it was estimated that 
there were 90,000 Muslim students in British universities and colleges. Of individuals 
under 30 years old, those that were born in the UK were two times as likely to have 
higher education degrees than those born elsewhere (Reed 2004, 8). There is plenty of 
numeric data showing the ongoing marginalization of minority groups in British society, 
demonstrating that integration of these populations has not been effective to the point that 
they can enjoy economic and social opportunities equal to those of the larger population. 
However, the data also shows that some aspects of their participation may be impacted 
more than others. 
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The Rushdie Affair 
 Arguably one of the most significant events of the 20th century for British 
Muslims was the aftermath of the publication of The Satanic Verses in 1988. The book, 
written by Salman Rushdie, is a fictional story based on the life of Mohammed and the 
founding of the Islamic faith that included various elements that Muslims throughout the 
world found to be highly offensive to their faith. Violent riots took place throughout 
Muslim communities and the Ayatollah Khomeini, or the Supreme Leader of Iran, called 
for the killing of the author of the book and all those involved in its publication. Many 
claimed that the book was blasphemous, leading the UK Action Committee on Islamic 
Affairs to bring the issue to the House of Lords, which ruled that the anti-blasphemy laws 
in Britain could only be applied to the Christian faith and were not relevant in this case 
(Brighton 2007, 8). 
 This event was the product of both endogenous and exogenous forces, seeing as 
Rushdie himself was a British citizen and that his work sparked a global commentary that 
came to impact the British Muslim community even more than the original work had. 
The political demonstration of Muslims throughout the U.K. in response to this issue led 
to the culmination of a large-scale, public recognition of an innate conflict in adopting 
both a Muslim and British identity. When moved to defend their Muslim tradition, it 
became more apparent than ever (not only to these individuals, but to the larger 
population, as well) that there might be a more serious barrier to integration due to 
irreconcilable cultural differences. This is yet another indicator of the persistent divide 
between the value structures of minority communities and that of the general British 
population.  
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Though a sizable public discourse ensued in the aftermath of what became known 
as the Rushdie Affair, various events concerning British foreign affairs quickly 
overshadowed any need for a political response, particularly British participation in the 
Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995 (Brighton 2007, 8). This failure on the part of the 
British Government to acknowledge the domestic issues at hand, coupled with the 
inability of existing British law to protect the religious equality of their minority 
populations, contributed to a significant shift in their political relationship. Anthony 
McRoy argues that it was at this point that a “longstanding, highly secularized Muslim 
community” realized that its “integration within a secular state had proved no guarantee 
of security” (Brighton 2007, 8). The consequences of the British government’s response 
to this event can, therefore, be considered a moment in which the state lost a great deal of 
its authority among its marginalized Muslim population.  
 
Limits to Political Participation and Integration 
Significant structural deficiencies exist in the political participation and 
representation of British Muslims, a problem exemplified in the case of the Muslim 
Council of Britain. The Council was established in 1997 as an independent organization 
representing more than 250 different local Muslim organizations and groups. The 
government initially saw this as an important step in creating an open dialogue as a 
pathway to greater understanding between policy makers and the Muslim community. 
The organization seemed to offer leadership for the larger Muslim community that had 
been lacking in this relationship, though it proved ineffective and potentially damaging 
over the next decade.  
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A central issue to this form of representation was that there is substantial 
fractionalization and conflict within the British Muslim population. As Lorenzo Vidino 
discusses in his work, Muslim communities are “internally divided by ethnicity, 
language, sect and political opinions”… which has caused an inability to “produce a 
common leadership” that can adequately represent their views (Vidino 2011). According 
to a study by the Open Society Institute in 2005, within the British Muslim population 
there are 56 nationalities, 70 languages spoken, and more than 1,200 mosques in which 
they practice their religion daily (Dyke 2009, 7). While not always true, powerful 
leadership within these smaller groups is often driven by theologically conservative 
religious figures that have little interest in integration and tend to contribute to their 
experience of marginalization within British society and that of the larger Muslim 
community (Khan 2010). That a single entity was entrusted with communicating the 
needs and views of a divided population was problematic, and even more so as 
individuals connected with Jemaat-e-Islami, an Islamic group ideologically similar to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, seemed to monopolize leadership of MCB itself (Vidino 2011). 
The impact of these more radical religious groups will be further discussed in the section 
on ideology.  
In the aftermath of September 11th and the 7/7 Bombings, interest in the 
understanding and prevention of radicalization increased, and isolating the causes for this 
phenomenon quickly became politically and socially divisive. MCB, in delivering public 
statements and investigations on the topic, largely placed the blame on the foreign policy 
initiatives of the government. Most British officials responded by saying that insufficient 
weight was given to the role of Islamic ideology and leadership within Muslim 
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communities, and many argued that the leadership of MCB was using the situation to 
further its own interests rather than presenting objective research that could inform 
political initiatives and working to denounce radicalization within their own 
communities. It became clear that the opinions of the MCB did not represent those of all 
Muslims or of the various organizations it claimed to speak for. Surveys of British 
Muslims in 2006 showed that only 4-6% felt that they were represented by MCB (Vidino 
2011). Soon after, the government publically moved away from its support for the 
organization, stating that it would only support groups that promoted and adhered to 
“non-negotiable” British values in the future. These events demonstrate that, while the 
British government has often acknowledged the need for Muslim representation and 
leadership in bridging the gap between policy and the British Muslim experience, this has 
not yet been executed adequately enough to make a substantial difference in 
participation.  
As these statistics, as well as those showing marginalization and a sustained flaw 
in the country’s immigration mechanisms, serve as indicators that whatever conservative 
change was attempted by the power-holding elites was inadequate. Whether this was due 
to intransigence on the government’s part or due to the ineffective nature of the actions 
taken, the problems of poor integration and marginalization persisted.  
 
The Individual in British Disequilibrium  
Public Opinion Among British Muslims 
 As was discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, Wallace’s “principle of 
conservation of cognitive structure” asserts that individuals may recognize the 
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dysfunction of society and be dissatisfied, but they will not change their conception of 
reality until another is presented or they have the opportunity to create a new one. This 
conception will come most potently in the form of a guiding ideology. However, prior to 
considering the ideologies available to the disenchanted Muslim population in Britain 
that led many to radicalize, it is first necessary to demonstrate that they were indeed 
dissatisfied and increasingly disassociated with their British identity.  
 In a compilation of attitudinal profiles from 2001 to 2011, Clive D. Field presents 
quantitative data from 27 different national opinion polls in order to capture the views of 
British Muslims over this period. Of those surveyed, four-fifths of young Muslims said 
that they identified more with their religion than their ethnicity, a much higher proportion 
than older Muslims answering. When asked whether they opposed marriage to non-
Muslims, 55 percent said yes, demonstrating some internal sense of a need for social 
distinction by religious background (Field 2011, 162). 41 percent said that they identified 
themselves first as Muslim and British second, with that number rising to 48 percent just 
following the 7/7 bombings. One-third said they felt they had more in common with 
Muslims abroad than with non-Muslims living in Britain. 25 percent said that they 
believed there was a conflict between their loyalty to the Muslim umma and their loyalty 
to Britain, with 15 percent saying they found it impossible to identify as both Muslim and 
British (Field 2011, 165).  
 Two-fifths said that they believed their religion influenced where they were able 
to live and one-third admitted that they preferred to live near other Muslims. On the topic 
of integration, three-fifths of younger Muslims said they thought Muslims as a whole 
needed to integrate more into British society, with one-quarter disagreeing (Field 2011, 
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165). The majority of those polled said they were concerned about stop-and-search 
policies and discrimination, with those over the age of 25 being twice as likely as older 
Muslims to say they had experienced police discrimination. 25 percent of younger 
Muslims also said that they believed the government was “anti-Muslim”, citing the unfair 
use of anti-terror laws to their communities (Field 2011, 168-169). The majority of those 
answering said they believed the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims had 
deteriorated after the 9/11 attacks and in 2004 there were already 42 percent of young 
Muslims claiming they suffered regularly from “islamophobia” (Field 2011, 169). These 
statistics show that in the first decade of the 21st century, there was evidence of a divisive 
relationship between Muslims, non-Muslims and the British government, with many 
saying they experienced discrimination based on their religion. This is indicative of 
feelings of isolation and a crisis of identity, which are symptomatic of an individual’s 
experience of systemic disequilibrium.  
This crisis of identity, often seen as crucial to the radicalization experience, can 
take place in an environment where learning about and connecting with their religious 
roots is easier than ever before. Individuals are able to seek out information that can 
contribute to self-persuasion, something McCauley finds characteristic of those 
undergoing radicalization. These individuals need more and more reasons to justify their 
developing radical ideas and, eventually, actions (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 420), 
and the growing supply of information that could function in this way only made this step 
in the process less challenging.  
Possibly even more important is the argument Faisal Devji makes in his book 
Landscapes of the jihad. Due to immigration and the forces of globalization, a fracturing 
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and reordering of the Muslim population has occurred internationally, creating a “global 
landscape” suitable for what we now see as global jihad (Devji 2005). Devji claims that 
this wide dispersion has made possible an ideology “that can be immediately accessed, 
understood and acted upon by anyone minded to do so, anywhere and without expert 
mediation or authoritative mandate” (Brighton 2007, 13). People around the world, 
previously unconnected, can access a broader community through mass media and social 
networking that communicates an experience of Western domination and vengeful 
motivation. These technological innovations and the resulting ease of cross-border 
communication can be considered exogenous sources of change to both the value 
structure and the socioeconomic environment. When combined with the pressures of 
immigration that had already brought the British system to a state of disequilibrium, the 
country’s dysfunction was only made deeper and more complex.   
In the British experience, the perceived lack of protection of their religious values 
and the alienation felt by the rejection of their Islamic heritage by society in the wake of 
events like the Rushdie Affair or 9/11 may have led individuals to seek out the global 
Muslim community—one that understands the difficult immigrant experience and 
reinforces a belief in an inherent “schism” between Islam and Western culture 
(Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009). Through modern means of communication, 
identifying with this “imagined community” can come to mean much more than the 
relationships formed in their domestic context. As Devji observes in his analysis of al 
Qaeda and the 7/7 bombers, the most important motivation to terrorist activity was the 
feeling of a “communal responsibility” to protect and defend their “Muslim brothers and 
sisters” (Brighton 2007, 14). The ease with which individuals within Britain could 
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connect with this global community is crucial to the ways in which some dealt with their 
crisis of identity. Even more crucial, however, was what this process of identification 
meant and the ideological weight that it carried.  
 
The Spread of Ideology 
 In addition to a rise in deviant behavior, Johnson also says that an identifier of a 
state of disequilibrium is the dissemination of ideologies. As has been discussed through 
Johnson’s interpretation of Anthony Wallace’s theory and through various theories of 
radicalization, the role of an ideology is vital to bringing a socialized member of society 
to radical terrorist action. Something important to point out here is that Islam in general is 
not the functioning ideology in this radicalization process. Rather, there are extremist 
sects of Islam whose interpretations of religion have become highly politicized and 
violent when compared to other branches of the religion. Therefore, it is necessary to 
identify what these ideologies are and how they came to have so much power among 
disenchanted British Muslims.  
 In his article in a 2008 issue of Granta magazine, Richard Watson shows how he 
found through extensive research a direct, though complex, link between Egyptian 
Sayyid Qutb and the ideology driving today’s Islamist terrorists. Qutb, having developed 
anti-Western sentiments and a commitment to an Islamic revival, became the intellectual 
leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as it was founded in 1928. The group 
positioned itself against colonialism and the imperial rule of Britain and called for a 
unified group of Arab states that would be governed exclusively by Islamic law. Qutb, 
through his teachings and the publishing of several books, claimed that any barrier or 
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opposition to this goal would have to be removed by force, including the existing state 
(Watson 2008, 41). Following his execution in 1966, many of his followers fled the 
country, among them his brother who went on to Saudi Arabia and continued spreading 
Qutb’s ideas. One follower, Omar Bakri Mohammed, went on to join Hizb ut-Tahrir in 
Lebanon, another group with the aim of establishing an Islamic caliphate. In 1986, he 
arrived in the United Kingdom as a political refugee and chose to establish an 
international branch of the group in London, which would later become the al-
Muhajiroun, modeled after a group of the same name that he had previously started in 
Saudi Arabia (Watson 2008, 43-45). 
 Throughout the 1990s, Bakri Mohammed traveled around to towns and cities with 
large Muslim populations to share his ideas and garner support through those he was able 
to convert. He lectured in schools and utilized religious communities in mosques, giving 
the greatest attention to young Muslim boys. Another influential ideologue was Abu 
Qatada, a proponent of the Islamic doctrine of takfirism. Qatada came to the UK from 
Jordan in 1993 seeking asylum, as did many other Islamic extremists not only from 
Jordan, but from Saudi Arabia and the Maghreb region, as well (Watson 2008, 51). By 
visiting mosques and speaking in inner-city youth clubs, Qatada was similarly able garner 
support from many young British citizens, some of which had been Muslim and others 
who converted to Islam as a result of his teachings (Watson 2008, 52-58). These youth 
clubs, and the schools and mosques visited by Bakri Mohammed, were the areas in which 
“cliques” of radical Islamic converts were able to form, a stage of radicalization 
considered to be critical by Sageman and many of the other theorists previously 
referenced. While the spread of these clerics’ influence is significant and identifiable, it is 
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important to consider the impact of events abroad on these relationships and the efficacy 
of their conversion efforts.  
 
Impacts of Globalization on Radicalization 
Watson makes sure to highlight the global nature of the spread of the terrorist 
ideology and the ways in which international networking have propelled its growth 
(2008). This network was facilitated by exogenous changes to the environment through 
technological innovation in communication and through cultural contact, each of which is 
capable of impacting the value structure. Furthermore, Johnson finds that a rapid 
circulation of ideologies is characteristic under a state of disequilibrium and power 
deflation created by the various sources of change discussed previously (Johnson 1982, 
88). With communication becoming increasingly swift, and with the rise of international 
networks of relationships, this diffusion of ideas becomes even more efficient.  
As these ideas were first being introduced to British communities, there were 
certain international events that made the timing of the conversion efforts opportune. For 
example, the impact of civil war in the Balkans, the repercussions of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, and conflict in Chechnya created opportunities for British Muslims to 
identify with and sympathize for the suffering of Muslims abroad (Watson 2008, 45). 
Shane Brighton discusses in his work the impact of the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo 
and the way they were perceived by British Muslims just following the events of the 
Rushdie Affair. These foreign conflicts meant that for the “longstanding, highly 
secularized Muslim community” of Britain, “integration within a secular state had proved 
no guarantee of security” (Brighton 2007, 8). Bakri Mohammed and other clerics were 
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able to exploit these associative feelings and channel their anger into these extremist 
dogmas.  
Taking into consideration their identification with the global Muslim community, 
it is reasonable that the British Muslim population would react to events involving Islam 
abroad, particularly those in which British foreign policy is involved. Beyond the events 
occurring at the time of Bakri Mohammed and Abu Qatada’s conversion efforts in the 
country, even more incidences have been added to the list of possible frustrations over 
the past few decades.  
There is wide recognition of the negative perception among British Muslims of 
Western involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the role of Britain in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In an aggregation of 27 national surveys conducted between 
2001 and 2009, Clive D. Field finds that the “War on Terror” was perceived by 81 
percent of young British Muslims as a war against Islam in 2004, though this number 
decreased to 60 percent in 2006. 72 percent of Muslims surveyed in 2002 disapproved of 
British involvement in Afghanistan and in 2004 85 percent disapproved of the war in 
Iraq, with about 75 percent stating that they were dissatisfied with Tony Blair as Prime 
Minister. In 2006, when asked which political issues were most important to them, 15 
percent said Iraq and 12 percent said foreign policy in general. With regard to British 
policy concerning Israel and Palestine, 54 percent of Muslims surveyed in 2005 said the 
Jewish community in Britain had no interest in the difficulties facing Palestinians and 50 
percent believed they have “excessive influence over British foreign policy” (Field 2011).  
The impact this dissatisfaction had on the level of radicalization at this time is 
demonstrated in numerous cases of British Muslims that went to Afghanistan to fight 
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against Western intervention, including Munir Farooqi. Following his time in the Middle 
East, he returned to the UK to begin his attempt at recruiting other British Muslims to 
fight with the Taliban. He was able to create a network through which he charismatically 
used various teachings, texts, videos, and his own experiences to inspire more individuals 
to radical action. He was convicted, along with a few of his recruits, in Manchester in 
2011 (pantucci 2011a). However, this trial and other similar stories of British fighters in 
Afghanistan revealed the possibility of many such individuals in Britain and abroad, and 
of the yet undiscovered extent of their network (Pantucci 2011b).  
By highlighting these international events along with the disadvantaged 
experiences of Muslims within Britain, many religious teachers were able to emotionally 
affect the young individuals in these marginalized communities in much the same way 
Ted Gurr found leaders mobilized the communal groups of his research (Gurr 1993). The 
significance of this strategy lies in the power of an individual’s perceived social and 
political identity, making clear the ways in which it facilitates the radicalization process 
under the correct circumstances. 
 
A Supportive International Environment 
Many British Muslims were encouraged to go to the Balkans and fight with the 
mujahedin, an honorable option for supporting the umma made affordable by the 
increased ease of travel at the time. When these individuals returned from fighting, they 
were received as respected heroes by these Muslim communities and had created 
relationships with other radical individuals during the conflict, which only served to 
strengthen their resolve moving forward (Watson 2008, 45-46). Others became motivated 
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by the conflict between Pakistan and India over Kashmir or by foreign intervention in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Watson 2008, 81). Whatever the source of frustration, there 
were numerous instances of Muslim suffering from which to choose.   
Due to the role Pakistan played throughout the war in Afghanistan, there was a 
well-established and extensive network of fundamentalist madrasas, or Islamic schools, 
throughout the country that had educated and trained a significant portion of those that 
fought in the Mujahedin. Many were even supported by the CIA throughout the 1980s for 
this purpose. Bakri Mohammed realized that these preexisting networks could be utilized 
for the training of British al-Muhajiroun members, and in 1999 he sent some of his 
closest British followers to start a branch in Pakistan (Watson 2008, 62).  
In 2001, a man acting as the media spokesman for the al-Muhajiroun in Pakistan 
claimed that 100 foreign fighters had already come through Pakistan to train and to fight 
with the Taliban, 60 of which he said were British (Watson 2008, 63). That same year, 
when the US Special Forces and the Northern Alliance attacked the Taliban following the 
9/11 attacks, the resulting humiliation to the group only helped to fuel the British 
members of the jihadi effort (Watson 2008, 64). By 2002, the spokesman said more than 
200 British citizens had gone through this expanded network in Pakistan, demonstrating 
the rate at which support had been growing among British Muslims (Watson 2008, 66).  
The leaders of this initiative slowly realized that terrorist missions and suicide 
bombings in Afghanistan, which had been a focus, were not furthering their cause in the 
ways they had hoped. Out of this realization and the discussions that followed came a 
decision to refocus their efforts and plan attacks on the British state from within. Just a 
few short years later, the bombings on the London transportation system on July 7, 2005 
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devastated the country, bringing the government and its intelligence operations to realize 
their shortcomings and causing a dramatic change in counterterrorism efforts, as will be 
discussed in the coming section on the use of force.  
 
Exogenous Change and the Rise of Homegrown Terrorism 
Terrorism, especially that based in violent Islamic jihad, was once perceived as being 
executed by foreign-born agents trained abroad who entered into other countries with the 
purpose of carrying out premeditated and coordinated attacks. Now, however, the greatest 
threat comes from primarily second- and third-generation immigrants that have been 
born, raised, and radicalized within these Western countries (King and Taylor 2011).  
Previously well-structured groups played an influential role in the increased 
prevalence of this type of terrorism. For example, when al Qaeda’s network began to 
suffer from the targeting and loss of much of its first-, second-, and third-generation 
leadership, it began actively encouraging sympathizers to stay in their home countries 
rather than travelling to join their organization, as physical movement posed a much 
higher risk of being tracked by government surveillance. Instead, they suggested that 
these people individually plan and carry out attacks within their countries, engaging in 
what has come to be known as Lone-Wolf Terrorism (Weimann 2012). Evidence shows 
that since 2003, the majority of homegrown European operations have been developed 
and run independently from other formal organizations (King and Taylor 2011, 613). 
Without the support of this larger terrorist network, and facing the threat of surveillance 
of physical meetings among sympathizers, communication through social networks, 
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Internet forums, and chat rooms has become crucial to the maintenance of jihadist ideals, 
regardless of temporal or spatial constraints.  
This online exchange of ideas was initially much more difficult for surveillance 
efforts to identify and created a new community accessible to a wide range of people 
across these Western states, generating more and more opportunities for individuals 
predisposed to radicalization to connect. Gabriel Weimann discusses the relevance of 
online interaction in his work, demonstrating that having a virtual “pack” behind 
individually conceived operations is crucial to their success. Weimann claims that “90% 
of terrorist activity on the Internet takes place using social networking tools,” which offer 
protection of individual identities, spaces for radical propaganda primarily targeting 
young people, and an opportunity for individuals to contact representatives of the terrorist 
movements in which they are interested, asking questions and contributing to the now 
global conversation of “cyber jihad”. The processes previously taking place in physical 
spaces have now migrated to a virtual environment, free of geographic constraints, 
relatively elusive to detection, and arguably capable of intensifying feelings of 
camaraderie and disclosure considered necessary to radicalization (Weimann 2012). 
 
Accelerators and the Use of Force 
 As Johnson presents in his model, once a power-holding elite faces a decline in 
authority and an increasingly disillusioned populace, a deterrence relationship arises 
between leadership and people that is dependent on the elite’s use of force. As a power 
deflation continues, “accelerators” pose a direct threat to the elite’s maintenance of 
control. These are certain events that make clear the loss of the elite’s monopoly of armed 
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force (Johnson 1982, 101-106). In the British case, the primary force combating the rise 
of terrorism and the threats it poses to national security are the state’s intelligence 
operations, rather than a traditional military force. In the wake of the 7/7 bombings, the 
various branches of British intelligence and government become abruptly aware of the 
ways in which they had underestimated the threat of these radical actors to national 
security. These events and the information demonstrating the inability of intelligence 
operations to deter these attacks function as accelerators within the British context.  
It is now known that MI5 had been monitoring Sidique Kham, the leader of the 
London bombings, and other terror suspects long before July of 2005, but they had been 
dismissed as posing little threat to the state since their efforts seemed to be focused 
primarily on Pakistan and other areas abroad (Watson 2008, 69). British authorities 
successfully stopped another attack planned for July 21 of that same year, though it was 
realized that the leader of this plot, Mukhtar Ibrahim, had also been under MI5 
surveillance just one year previously and was similarly dismissed as non-threatening 
(Watson 2008, 76).  
 Going back even farther than these actors, MI5 was also aware of the conversion 
efforts of Abu Qatada and other preachers like him. An intelligence analyst source of 
Watson’s claims these people were able to live and operate in Britain without 
intervention in the hopes that security officials would be able to gain even more valuable 
intelligence in exchange for their being left alone. However, it would seem that these 
tactics did not end up benefiting intelligence efforts in the ways they had planned. It is 
also possible, the source says, that MI5 was being given false or incorrect information 
over this period (Watson 2008, 59-60).  
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According to one source within MI5, intelligence officials were only becoming 
aware of the rapid growth of radical Islamist activity in the country as recently as 2003, 
by which time hundreds of British citizens had already gone abroad for training and 
recruitment (Watson 2008, 39). Sir David Omand, the government’s intelligence 
coordinator from 2002 to 2005, has said that British Muslim radicalization had been 
monitored even before the 9/11 attacks on New York. Sir Paul Lever, a former chair of 
the Joint Intelligence Committee, has called this inaction a “failure of the imagination” on 
the part of the British government and its security services (Watson 2008, 39). However, 
knowledge of these processes was not sufficient to prevent attacks that no one could have 
anticipated at the time. It was difficult to prove criminal activity and much of the 
fundraising efforts for these radical actors and their followers were conducted through 
registered charities. The propaganda and spreading of ideology was not itself illegal, and 
before the 7/7 bombings the work being done by such individuals did not give officials 
reason to believe that any violent action would be taken against the UK itself (Watson 
2008, 60). In short, preventing terrorist action, and the spread of radical ideologies that 
might contribute to such action, is an extremely difficult and complex task for 
intelligence operations, especially as they stood fifteen years ago.  
Even outside of the intelligence organizations, many feared that accusing these 
individuals of threatening activity at the time would be considered a direct attack on a 
faith, something that could have further alienated an already marginalized population, 
even under the attitudes of multiculturalism at the end of the 20th century (Watson 2008, 
81). Though this fear is valid, Watson claims that allowing these radicals to operate 
unhindered in the country for over twenty years strengthened their efforts, making them 
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feel “increasingly invincible” (Watson 2008, 81). Government inaction, along with the 
many factors contributing to the disadvantaged British Muslim experience throughout 
this period, only made the relative weakness of moderate Muslims more acute and 
decreased the likelihood that they would speak out against growing extremists groups 
(Watson 2008, 81).  
Since the London attacks of 2005, a notable shift has occurred in the management 
of resources and in the effort of MI5 to catch up with the threat of terrorism in the 
country. However, the efforts of the intelligence community and the government in 
reaction to the attacks have taken place primarily in incidental areas, such as the 
expansion of counterterrorism laws, the introduction of laws allowing for detention 
without trial, and heightened surveillance measures (Watson 2008, 39-40). While these 
changes demonstrate that there is acknowledgement of the need to change the state’s 
approach to counterterrorism efforts, they still do not impact the marginalization of 
British Muslim communities in the country. Since 9/11, and even more so since the 
London bombings, there as been an increase in “islamaphobia” and more intellectual 
support for the War on Terror where there used to be a focus on more liberal innovation. 
This focus on fighting terrorism and, more specifically, Islamic forces, has served to 
create an even more divisive discourse in Britain. Jason Cowley, editor of Granta 
magazine, has said, “Britain has become a more troubled, less confident and harmonious 
country” since the attacks (2008, 7). A state that had already been suffering from 
systemic dysfunction and a growing loss of authority among its minority groups will not 
possibly see a return to equilibrium as long as this division continues.  
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An Example: “Jihadi John” 
 At the close of 2014 and as 2015 began, there have been numerous stories 
covered by the media heightening British concern, particularly due to continuing 
evidence of the involvement of British citizens. One recent development has been 
unveiling the identity of so-called “Jihadi John” who is now known to be Mohammed 
Emwazi. Emwazi was born in Kuwait and raised in West London beginning at age six in 
a middle-class family (CAGE Editor 2015). He has a degree in computer programming 
from the University of Westminister and, after graduating, he attempted to travel to 
Tanzania with friends in 2009, but he was detained due to suspicion that he was traveling 
to Somalia to join al-Shabab, an Islamist extremist group. Once brought back to the UK, 
he was questioned by MI5 and placed on a “terror watchlist” (Taylor 2015). After this 
incident, he joined CAGE, which describes itself as an “independent advocacy 
organization working to empower communities impacted by the War on Terror” (CAGE 
2015). He claimed that he faced a long period of “harassment” and “abuse” by the British 
government and its security agencies due to their suspicion of his terrorist involvement, 
culminating in his being banned from travelling to Kuwait where he claims he planned to 
start a new life. These experiences are what he considers the cause of feelings of severe 
anxiety and alienation (CAGE Editor 2015).  
 Various individuals have claimed that Emwazi’s connections to radical ideas 
began about five or six years ago. He was part of a group of individuals that attended the 
same mosque and often played football together, many of whom were found by MI5 to be 
connected with the men involved in the 21 of July bombing plot in 2007 (Cobain, 
MacAskill and Ramesh 2015). He has since become one of the leading members of the 
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Islamic State, most notable for his presence in numerous videos of displays of violence 
towards hostages.  
 Emwazi’s story demonstrates how this process of radicalization can unfold. 
Though raised in Britain from a young age outside of the experience of poverty, and 
having earned a degree in higher education, he came to be part of this militarized group. 
Though we do not know all of the details of his story at this point, it seems that through 
experiences of isolation and perceived discrimination, small group connections with 
individuals linked to radical religious ideologies, and motivated by the experiences of his 
global Muslim “brotherhood”, Emwazi came to be “jihadi john”. By understanding the 
backgrounds of individuals such as Emwazi, we can understand a great deal more about 
the ways people accept and pursue radical ideologies. However, it is also important to 
remember that these individuals were members of a disequilibrated social system that 
generated the situations in which they were more able to reorient their “mazeways”, as 







Conclusion and Further Research 
 
As of 2008, MI5 reported that it was monitoring at least 200 known active 
indigenous terror cells in the country and that more than 4,000 British Muslims were 
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considered threats to national security (Cowley 2008, 7). Since then, we have seen more 
than a few displays of Islamist radicalism in action not only in Britain but also around the 
world. In the past year alone we have seen a significant rise in the Islamic State’s global 
presence and the attacks on Charlie Hebdo in France, along with a number of other 
events, have led the global community to its current position, constantly attempting to 
formulate plans for protection from, and solutions to, the modern threats nations face.  
While the world attempts to confront the spreading influence of Islamist 
terrorism, the most crucial issues are those that pose a direct threat to the state’s national 
security, especially those that have grown from within the state itself. This examination 
of the British experience has demonstrated that there are many variables involved in the 
rise of such a situation. Each of these may be isolated and analyzed as independent from 
the others, placing a focus on immigration policies, integration through schooling, the 
presence of radical churches and societies, or the faults of national intelligence. However, 
extensive study or political energy put into any one of these areas independently can only 
lead to an incomplete understanding of such a complex issue. Rather, each component 
must undergo a study of its independent influence in the context of its interdependent 
relationship with the others. Chalmers Johnson’s theory of revolution offers such a 
framework, demonstrating that there are structural, individual, and global levels of 
analysis from which such a phenomenon must be understood.  
In the context of the rise of homegrown British terrorism, exogenous and 
endogenous sources of change shifted the value structure and the socioeconomic 
environment out of alignment, such as the increase in immigration and internal policy 
change under Margaret Thatcher. Due to a failure of the evolutionary processes found to 
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be characteristic of a healthy social system in homeostasis, this misalignment brought 
about a state of disequilibrium. The resulting dysfunction of the British social system is 
evident in the rise of crime and status protests, especially among isolated ethnic and 
racial minority communities. Such demonstrations of discontent are also evidence of a 
power deflation, wherein these protesting groups increasingly become disillusioned and 
mistrustful of the ruling elites and their related institutions.  
Though the ruling parties acknowledged deficiencies in integration mechanisms 
and recognized the disproportional instance of poverty, crime, and unemployment among 
these minority communities, no policy change sufficiently adequate to mitigate the 
situation was put in place. Not only have these communities been isolated socially, but 
they have also been isolated from the political process, as a functional system for 
representation of the British Muslim population has not yet been realized. As the power 
deflation has continued, it has been exacerbated by the influence of various global events 
impacting the British Muslim view of their home society. Western intervention in 
conflicts concerning Muslim populations abroad, the perceived suffering of the umma, 
increasing “islamophobia” in the wake of attacks such as 9/11, and cases like the Rushdie 
Affair have led to a loss of authority for the British power-holding elites in the eyes of 
their Muslim citizens.  
As these groups gradually have lost their faith in their place within the British 
framework, religious teachers, often from abroad, have introduced radical ideologies, 
capable of harnessing their dissatisfaction and framing it within the rhetoric of an 
irreconcilable dichotomy that poses the global Muslim community against the British 
system and its Western counterparts. Various theories of radicalization have been used to 
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explain the ways in which small group dynamics, often in religious schools, youth 
organizations, and schools, allow these ideologies to take root and deepen the collective 
resolve to take radical action. The forces of globalization and the lasting impacts of the 
war in Afghanistan laid the network through which these small groups in Britain were 
able to connect with terrorist cells and their relationships in Pakistan and other countries 
in the region. These cross-border relationships have created a global web that is further 
strengthened, expanded and diversified by the globalizing forces of technological 
innovation and its resulting facilitation of rapid and evasive means of communication. 
Through this constantly adapting network, radical Islamist ideology has itself been able 
to circulate and expand, evolving into the threat we see today. 
According to Johnson, when authority has been lost the relationship between the 
elite and this group becomes dependent on the elite’s control of force. In the British 
context, the forces utilized to fight the terrorist threat have primarily been the country’s 
intelligence organizations. Over the past fifteen years, however, information has slowly 
come to light demonstrating that intelligence operations have been inadequate in their 
fight to protect the nation from terrorist action. These moments of realization have served 
as accelerators to the deterrence relationship brought about by the loss of authority. They 
have given radical opposition groups of these disenchanted British citizens and groups to 
which they are connected a sense that the British government and its tools of force are 
incapable of stopping efforts of insurgency. The resulting rise in the confidence of 
terrorist organizations with British roots is an ongoing phenomenon that can explain 
various attacks of Islamist terrorism, including cases like that of Jihadi John and those to 
which he is connected. 
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While this is a complex and interdisciplinary view of the British case, it can offer 
a more complete understanding of Islamist radicalization in this country and potentially 
shed some light on the experience of other nations similarly affected. This analysis shows 
that internal and external influences to the social experience and the division of labor may 
cause dysfunction, but the parties in power can correct it through adequate policy change. 
It is when these policy efforts do not prioritize the successful integration, socialization, 
social control, and reconciliation of the various goals valued by its citizens that the 
dysfunction will worsen. Met with a power deflation and, potentially, a refusal on the part 
of the dissatisfied populace to recognize their government’s authority, a society arrives at 
the point where its leaders are finally acknowledging of the gravity of their situation. 
However, this acknowledgement is most likely left unproductive, as authorities are 
unable to formulate a complete and coherent solution in which their citizens can place 
their full faith once again.  
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a state to prevent the circulation of new ideas. 
However, it should be the priority of the state to make the ideologies that support a 
unified nation of organized diversity more attractive and satisfying than the revolutionary 
alternatives. This can only occur if the values of the population and those of the power 
structure consistently reflect one another. At the base of this understanding is the view 
that the people and their government are in a reciprocal relationship, wherein one grants 
authority and the other privileges. This balance between the values of society and its 
social and economic structures can be maintained through the evolutionary processes 
Johnson identifies within homeostatic equilibrium, though this requires the reciprocal 
relationship itself be sustained.  
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These central values naturally differ across cultures, meaning that this analysis 
cannot possibly prescribe any specific policy initiatives. Instead, this study can suggest 
that a government be cognizant of the values of the people it represents and receptive to 
their changing through time. It is necessary to point out that such a society, based in 
priorities of communication and cooperation, will most likely be characteristic of a 
democratic political structure. While this study on its own has not addressed the 
significance of differences in political structure, such a topic is worthy of future study. 
In conducting a study of this sort, the consideration of a range of subject countries 
would be beneficial to deepening this understanding. It will be most important to apply 
this model across cultural differences in order to demonstrate that it can explain a variety 
of state experiences. Finding a single and significant commonality from which one could 
expand to conduct a comparison study would be helpful, whether it be similar political 
histories, cultural similarities, regional associations, political structure, specific 
experiences of terrorism, or any number of other factors.  
For example, due to its relationship to this issue and its relevance today, France 
would be a perfect case study within which this approach may be used. The work 
presented here, being restricted temporally, has not incorporated the experience of this 
notable country. However, this work would benefit from such a comparison, as France is 
the only other European country that has seen a larger proportion of its citizens moving to 
join the ISIS movement. In fact, as of March of 2015, this number was double that of the 
British case, estimated at 1,200 individuals (Sharma 2015). There are important 
differences between the French and British cases that would make such a study 
revelatory. For example, the two countries saw differing approaches to secularism over 
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the past half-century, the French being much more focused on strict secular policies and 
the British often more focused on a multicultural rhetoric. Despite this difference, they 
have arrived at similarly troubling situations. This is but one example of an interesting 
and relevant extension that could potentially come from the understandings contributed 
by the work presented here. 
The topic of terrorism and its role in transforming global politics will continue to 
be significant and consequential in the years to come. What this study can conclusively 
offer is the importance of approaching these future studies with an interdisciplinary 
respect for the interrelated and contingent factors at play. Such work will require the 
consideration of all three levels of analysis—the structural, the global, and the 
individual—and the acknowledgement that no situation so global and evolutionary in 
nature can be understood fully by reducing it to an isolation of its basic components. 
Such complexity must be accepted and viewed as such so that we may come to 
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